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Evaluating the Impact of Labour Market Reforms in Greece  
during 2010-2018 
Georgios Gatopoulos1, Alexandros Louka2, Ioannis Polycarpou3 and 
Nikolaos Vettas4 
ABSTRACT  
In view of long-standing weaknesses in Greece’s labour markets, several labour market 
reforms were implemented during the economic adjustment programmes with two 
objectives. Firstly, support the economy’s adjustment through more flexible labour markets 
and secondly, enhance gains in cost competitiveness. In relation to their objectives, we find 
evidence that reforms largely fulfilled the second objective and partially the first, albeit left 
mostly unaddressed some of the long-standing weaknesses, such as low participation rate 
and high tax wedge. The analysis is backed by two distinct but complementary approaches. 
From a micro-founded analysis, while the 2014 reduction in social security contributions 
positively affected incentives for official sector labour participation, those appear to have 
decreased cumulatively during the overall programme period. From a top-down 
macroeconomic perspective, findings suggest that Greece’s 2012 labour market reforms had 
a positive impact on reducing Unit Labour Cost (ULC), increasing the use of flexible forms of 
employment, slowing down unemployment rate dynamics and slightly accelerating 
employment growth trends. At the same time, it appears that the 2012 reforms did not 
improve labour participation rates, while they increased average working hours and 
inequality. 
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The Greek labour market had traditionally been facing significant challenges such as low 
productivity, low participation rate, high unemployment, high tax wedge, low use of flexible 
employment forms and high share of self-employed. In the context of three consecutive bail 
out programs, the Greek state legislated and implemented various reforms aiming to restore 
its fiscal sustainability and external competitiveness. In this context, the most radical 
structural reforms took place in the labour market and had a two-fold objective. First, to 
support the economy’s adjustment, through higher labour market flexibility in order to 
cushion the crisis’ negative impact on employment and facilitate a faster employment 
recovery. Second, to pursue gains in cost competitiveness in order to adjust the external 
imbalances. 
This study evaluates the impact of Greek labour market reforms during the bailout 
programmes (2010-2018) in relation to their objectives and beyond. To this effect, we follow 
two distinct but complementary methodological approaches. The first is based on micro-
founded simulations at the level of households, through which we evaluate the impact of 
reforms on microeconomic incentives of individuals in relation to entering the formal labour 
market. The second is based on a top-down macroeconomic perspective at a cross-country 
level, applying the generalized synthetic control method, which allows to estimate 
counterfactual paths for selected macroeconomic and social indicators in the absence of 
labour market reforms. 
The current paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts highlighting 
the long-standing challenges in the Greek labour market. Section 3 provides a brief overview 
of main labour market reforms which took place in Greece during the economic adjustment 
programmes. A literature review in Section 4 provides background information on published 
empirical analysis on labour markets in Greece and other countries. The micro-founded 
simulations focusing on labour participation incentives are illustrated in Section 5. Then the 
following Section 6 presents the econometrics estimations at a cross country level offering 
insights from a macroeconomic perspective. The conclusions Section 7 highlights the main 
findings and some of their forward-looking implications. 
 
2. Stylized facts of the Greek labour market 
During the first decade of the adoption of the euro, the Greek economy’s price 
competitiveness weakened relative to the euro area average, but also relative to other 
southern euro area peers, such as Spain and Portugal. Greek nominal unit labour costs 
increased by around 47 percent from 2001 to 2010. In comparison, unit labour costs for the 
euro area, Portugal and Spain increased by approximately 20, 22 and 31 percent respectively 
(Figure 1). Besides, wages in Greece grew faster than productivity, both in nominal and real 




grew faster than wages in the case of other southern euro area peers, such as Spain and 
Portugal.  
This divergence contributed to increasing external imbalances with current account deficits 
peaking at over 15 percent of GDP in 2008. Labour market reforms that could help realign 
wages with productivity and restore cost competitiveness were therefore a priority of the 
economic adjustment programmes. This prioritization was further backed by the absence of 
other adjustment channels such as the exchange rate.  
 
Figure 1: Unit labour costs, wages and productivity growth in Greece versus the Euro Area 
 
 
Source: Ameco. Note: Nominal ULC is defined as the ratio of compensation per employee to real GDP per person 
employed. Wage is defined as gross wage per employee. Productivity is defined as GDP per person employed. 
 
The Greek labour market has traditionally been marked by low participation rates, compared 
to its European peers, which translates into a high share of working age population not willing 
to join the labour force (Figure 2). Greece’s labour force participation rate is low especially 
among women, around 60% in 2018 compared to 68% for the euro area average, and despite 
progress during the last couple of decades, Greece has not yet converged with its European 
peers, as Spain did during the same period5. Participation rates are particularly low among 
 









































































































































young population 15-24 years old, inter alia due to the high share of tertiary education 
graduates in Greece, as well as among population aged 50-64 years old, likely affected by the 
wide use of early retirement schemes up until the programme periods. 
 
Figure 2: Labour participation rate in Greece compared to the Euro Area  
 
Source: Eurostat. Note: Labour participation is defined as the ratio of Labour Force over Population aged 15-64. 
 
A significant counterincentive for labour force participation is the very high labour taxation. 
The aggregate tax burden measured either by social security contribution rates or by total tax 
wedge, has systematically been above common practice in other advanced economies (Figure 
3). This distorts microeconomic incentives for individuals to enter the official sector labour 
market and encourages the development of informal labour relations. On a cross-country 
perspective, it is further observed that the higher the rate of employers’ social security 
contributions, the higher the unemployment rate, at least in the recorded formal labour 
market. As a result, one of the dimensions of the labour market reforms under the economic 
adjustment programmes intended to encourage the shift from informal towards the formal 
labour market, inter alia through lower social security contributions, within the particularly 












































































































































































Figure 3: Social security contribution rates and tax wedge in Greece compared to peers 
 
 
Source: OECD. Note: Tax wedge is measured by the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by a two-earner 
married couple (one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 %) with 2 children and the corresponding 
total labour cost for the employer. 
 
Furthermore, high degree of employment protection, combined with low degree of use of 
flexible forms of employment have been common features of the labour markets in southern 
euro area members. Indicatively, part-time employment in Greece corresponded on average 
to 5% of total employment during 2000-2010, compared to 18% for the euro area, while the 
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The average number of working hours for full-time employees in Greece, while higher than in 
the Euro Area average, had been declining during the pre-crisis expansion phase, contrary to 
the increasing trend in the Euro area (Figure 5). This may relate to regulations increasing the 
cost of overtime work or of forms of employment beyond the regular work timetable. At the 
same time, the average number of working hours for part-time employees in Greece have 
been close to Euro Area average and above the respective hours of southern peers. 
 




A significant structural feature of the Greek labour market is that almost one in every four 










































































































































































6). Consequently, the labour market consists of many sole proprietorships and micro 
enterprises, unlike other countries where the workforce mostly consists of wage earners. The 
share of self-employed in Greece has slightly declined during the crisis, but it has not 
eliminated its gap with the Euro Area average, like it did in Portugal. 
 





3. Overview of labour market reforms in Greece during 2010-2018 
In view of the stylized facts of Greece’s labour markets, at the onset of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the economic adjustment programmes included labour market reforms with at least 
two objectives. 
Firstly, to support the adjustment in the economy, through reforms targeting to ease labour 
market rigidities. The goal was to cushion the negative impact on employment when domestic 
demand was severely hit by the crisis, as well as to facilitate a faster recovery of employment 
as soon as the country would return to positive economic growth. More flexible labour market 
regulations and price adjustments (wage cuts) were preferred to volume adjustments 
(layoffs), also considering that resources for the welfare state had been highly constrained. 
Secondly, to enhance gains in cost competitiveness. In the absence of an exchange rate policy 
instrument, the competitiveness channel required adjustment in relative prices and nominal 
wages to correct the large imbalances in Greece's external accounts. The policy of internal 
devaluation would have side effects on households’ purchasing power like the ones of a sharp 
currency devaluation, in the case the exchange rate instrument had been available. This in 
turn would have led to higher inflation and thereby lower real wages translating into more 
expensive imports. 
Both objectives aimed to preserve existing jobs, to facilitate the creation of new ones, to 








































economies. In view of these objectives, a broad range of policy interventions in the labour 
markets mainly touched upon five dimensions (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Indicative labour market reforms in Greece during 2010-2018 
Labour market 
dimension 
Policy rationale Year Legal reference 




Increase the system's flexibility and 
decentralization, to facilitate adjustment via wages 






          
II. National 
minimum wage 
Reduce Greece’s minimum wage to lower labour 
costs, keep the low skilled from being priced out of 
the formal labour market, introduce new setting 
mechanism based on tri-partite consultation and 






          
III. Employment 
protection 
Reduce Greece's exit costs to foster employment. 2012 Laws 
4046/2012, 
4093/2012 
          
IV. Flexible forms 
of employment 
Facilitate flexible forms of employment to increase 






          
V. Labour tax 
wedge 
Reduce non-wage costs mainly through employers' 







The measures pursued included revising the wage setting mechanisms, reducing exit costs 
and hence making hiring more attractive, introducing more flexible working time, reducing 
non-wage costs, combating undeclared work and improving active labour market policies. In 
relation to wage setting, a series of measures concerned the framework of collective 
bargaining as well as national minimum wage setting, inter alia aiming to remove automatic 
increases in bonuses and allowances that, over time, decoupled wages from productivity. In 
parallel, measures aimed to ease employment protection, enhance flexible forms of 
employment, tackle undeclared labour and lower the tax wedge, albeit within tight fiscal 
constraints. More specifically, labour reforms during the economic adjustment programmes 
included the following eight areas of measures. 
(1) Collective bargaining framework. Measures implemented in 2011 and 2012 inter alia 
included (a) the temporary suspension of the extension mechanism of collective 
agreements, (b) the possibility for firm level collective agreements to prevail over sectoral 
and occupational agreements (suspension of favourability principle), (c) the restriction of 
‘after effects’ of collective agreements, and (d) the revision of the rules on recourse to 




effective representation within collective bargaining. The objective was to put firms in a 
flexible position to adjust through price rather than through volume (layoffs) and 
informality. 
(2) Minimum wage setting framework. The minimum wage was reduced by 22% (32% for 
employees up to 25 years old) in February 2012. The setting mechanism was modified in 
that the statutory minimum wage is set by the government following consultation with 
social partners and input by stakeholders taking into consideration economic and social 
criteria. The rationale of the new mechanism was to strengthen evidence-based wage 
floor setting, as well as to directly involve the government through a tri-partite framework 
into steering labour market developments as a third party while considering the various 
objectives expressed by incumbent employees and employers. 
(3) Employment protection. The probation period for new hires was extended (2010), the 
severance payment and notification periods for dismissals were reduced (2012). The 
rationale was to facilitate firms’ increased responsiveness to the economic cycle at the 
extensive margin, by lowering exit costs to encourage hiring despite the volatile and 
uncertain crisis environment. 
(4) Flexible forms of employment. The use and renewal of fixed-term contracts was facilitated 
(2011), regulations for part-time shift work and working time arrangements were made 
more flexible (2010, 2011 and 2012), premia for part-time and overtime work were 
reduced (2010), the scope of temporary work agencies was broadened in line with other 
countries (2010 and 2014). The rationale was to facilitate firms’ increased responsiveness 
to the economic cycle at the intensive margin, as well as to enhance labour participation 
and shift informal labour relations into the formal labour market. 
(5) Tax wedge and non-wage labour costs. Employers’ social security contribution rates were 
reduced by 1.1 and 2.9 percentage points in 2012 and 2014 respectively, while employees’ 
contributions were reduced by 1 percentage point in 2014. Besides, bureaucracy on 
labour arrangements has been reduced, inter alia through abolishing the pre-approvals of 
overtime work and streamlining other reporting requirements (2012 and 2014). The 
rationale was to reduce labour costs and strengthen the incentives for employment 
without negatively affecting take home salary. 
(6) Active labour market policies. Both public and EU funds were used to implement short-
term public work programmes (2013 onwards), internships with youth voucher schemes, 
while apprenticeships and vocational training schemes were revisited with an aim to 
increase their effectiveness. The rationale was to assist job finding and enhance the 
skillset of the large shares of the population who were either unemployed or inactive. 
(7) Undeclared work. Stricter sanctions for undeclared work were imposed (2013), the labour 
inspectorate initiated a multi-year action plan including risk-based audits, digital systems 




motivation was to combat the high rates of informal work in Greece which have a negative 
impact on workers’ insurance rights as well as on public finances. 
(8) Labour institutions and transparency.  The Labour Inspectorate (SEPE) introduced risk 
based, more targeted audits, the Public Employment Service (OAED) was restructured, 
the Arbitration Body (OMED) was complemented by an appeal committee, the Supreme 
Labour Council (ASE) was upgraded in that it obtained a decisive role with regards to the 
process of collective dismissals. Transparency in relation to monitoring labour market 
developments and data disclosure were improved, including through the initiation of 
digital systems such as ERGANI for employment flows, ARTEMIS for undeclared work 
audits, as well as through the creation of the National Employment Institute (EIEAD). 
Overall, within the bailout programmes’ set of structural reforms, it is widely perceived that 
labour market reforms were the most pronounced. Lyberaki et al. (2017) provide an overview 
of labour market regulation and reforms in Greece. In the context of its post-programme 
evaluation, ESM (2020) notes that the labour market reforms caused an initial drop in wages, 
followed by a revival in employment and remuneration in line with productivity gains. Despite 
the magnitude of policy interventions in the labour market, the unemployment rate in Greece 
increased significantly during the crisis, peaking at around 27 percent in 2013, while only 
gradually fading out since then, with a negative impact on productivity, poverty rates and 
inequality indicators. One explanation offered by policy experts is the inadequate sequencing 
of reform implementation during the bailouts, i.e. the lack of parallel front-loaded 
implementation of product market reforms (Meghir et al., 2017). In such turbulent periods, it 
is of course hard to identify an adequate counter-factual scenario to isolate the effects of 
labour market reforms. Our work aims to offer further insights towards that direction. 
 
 
4. Literature review 
There is extensive theoretical work in relation to the impact of distinct labour market 
measures, such as the ones pursued during the programmes. These strands of literature may 
offer mixed conclusions depending on the prioritized policy objectives, especially on 
controversial issues such as the minimum wage, the degree of centralization of collective 
bargaining, or the optimal degree of employment protection.  
In the context of collective bargaining, for instance, economic theory on the one hand 
suggests that broadening the scope of firm-level bargaining is efficient because it allows 
agreements to account for the particular circumstances of firms in a weaker condition. 
Empirical findings by Bertola et al. (2010) provide evidence that firms covered by higher-level 
collective wage agreements were more likely to pursue cost reduction by reducing the 
number of temporary employees and less likely to reduce wages. They further found that 




following a cost-push shock. Such a business practice would risk resulting in a damaging spiral 
of wage and price increases, further eroding competitiveness. Notwithstanding, Boeri (2014) 
has argued that a two-tier bargaining system may reduce the scope for efficient firm-level 
bargaining, while there is also critique that fully decentralized systems may hinder collective 
bargaining. In the case of Greece, Kosma et al. (2017) find that labour reforms effectively 
facilitated firms to adjust both labour input and wages during the crisis. 
According to international practice with respect to the minimum wage setting mechanism, 
ILO (2014a) notes that such wage setting decisions should be made following tripartite social 
dialogue and collective bargaining should be informed and evidence based. From a cross-
country perspective, ILO (2014b) finds that the state has an active role in setting minimum 
wages in the majority of ILO member states. Nonetheless, the issue of who holds the ultimate 
decision-making power (government or social partners) as well as to what extent changes in 
the minimum wage spillover to the whole wage ladder or affect unemployment remain 
controversial issues for which empirical evidence is mixed. In the case of Greece, Georgiadis 
et al. (2018) find that minimum wages are highly correlated with the median wage, but no 
conclusive evidence for systematic employment effects, while Kanellopoulos (2015) points 
out a negative relationship between minimum wage and employment. Focusing on the 2012 
minimum wage reduction in Greece, Yannelis (2014) supports evidence that hiring increased, 
while unemployment effects kicked in only above a certain threshold of minimum wage. The 
IMF (2019) presents evidence that Greek sectors with higher minimum wage share witnessed 
a higher drop in wages but also a smaller employment reduction. Georgiadis et al. (2020) find 
no significant impact of the 2012 reform on job separations, implying that changes in 
employment stemmed from changes in hirings.  
In the context of this research project, we focus on empirical literature findings and 
methodologies aiming to assess the impact of labour market reforms on both microeconomic 
incentives and the macroeconomic framework. Indicatively for collective bargaining, 
institutional reforms during the programme aimed at increasing flexibility, decentralization, 
and effective representation. OECD (2011) argues that the prevalence of sector-level 
bargaining, the automatic extension of bargaining agreements, and a unilateral recourse to 
arbitration have contributed to the rise in labour costs and high minimum wages for new 
entrants to the labour market during the pre-crisis period. Hence, the objective of the reforms 
was to put firms in a flexible position to align pay with productivity and adjust labour costs 
through price rather than through volume (layoffs) and informality. Micro level evidence 
suggests that firm-level agreements signed after the reforms indeed led to downwards 
adjusting wages. Koukiadaki and Kokkinou (2012) and Ioannou and Papadimitriou (2013) 
provide evidence that most post-reform firm-level agreements stipulated either wage 
reductions or adjustments to the levels of the national minimum wage. Christopoulou and 
Monastiriotis (2016) document that wage adjustments in the private sector have been of at 




et al. (2017) do not find strong evidence of a negative relationship between wages and 
regional unemployment except during the early crisis period 2010-2011.  
The impact of labour market reforms has been studied in other southern Euro Area peers like 
Spain and Portugal, which have commonalities with the Greek labour market and which also 
went through economic adjustment programmes. OECD (2014) use a regression discontinuity 
in time (RDiT) approach allowing them to compare labour market performance before and 
after the reforms’ date of enactment. They find that labour market reforms contributed to 50 
percent of the observed drop in Spanish unit labour costs. OECD (2017) notes that reforms on 
employment protection had significant positive impact, contrary to the mixed impact of 
reforms on collective bargaining. Stepanyan and Salas (2020) assess the impact of the Spanish 
labour market reforms on income distribution and macroeconomic variables such as 
employment growth, youth unemployment rate and in-work poverty. They find that reforms 
significantly enhanced employment and income equality, albeit in-work poverty and 
involuntary part-time work were also negatively affected.  
This work aims to build upon the existing literature and shed light on at least two key fronts: 
(a) evaluate the impact of Greek labour market reforms on microeconomic incentives of 
individuals to enter the formal labour market, as per Section 5 and (b) estimate the impact of 
labour market reforms on selected macroeconomic and social indicators, as per Section 6. 
 
5. Microeconomic approach 
5.1. Data and methodology 
In this section, we estimate the incentives for official sector labour supply, i.e. the probability 
for a working age person to participate in the labour market. For our calculations we focus on 
persons who already work to explore possible “unemployment traps” in case they become 
unemployed. In particular, we simulate the transition from employment to unemployment 
status and calculate the taxes, contributions and social benefits that the person receives in 
each state. The analysis concerns the short-term horizon, for as long as the unemployed is 
eligible for unemployment benefits, in which period we quantify the incentive for 
employment.6  
For the purposes of our analysis, we estimate these incentives for labour force participation 
in three distinct time periods using the respective micro datasets. Such incentives are 
estimated in the beginning and at the end of the memoranda (2010 and 2018), as well as in 
2014. The latter is chosen because we also assess the impact of a reduction of employees’ 
contributions by 1 percentage point which took place in 2014 (“reform”) on the incentives for 
employment, for the whole labour force, as well as distinctly for population groups with 
 
6 A comprehensive analysis focusing on the long-term labour supply effects and incidence of payroll taxes on 




traditionally lower participation rates in the official sector labour market, such as women and 
young population. 
We use micro-data for Greek households from the EU Survey for Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) during the crisis years and up until 2018. For the purposes of our methodology, 
following some filtering criteria described below, a sub-sample of the data from EU-SILC is 
used as input within a microsimulation framework with the deployment of EUROMOD. This 
tool applies tax and benefit policy rules which hold within a given year (policy system) and 
simulates in detail the taxes, benefits, social insurance contributions at both the individual 
and the household level. It can also compute accurately the respective disposable income for 
each household when the system rules are applied (Sutherland and Figari, 2013). EUROMOD 
has been extensively used for simulation of policy reforms (Leventi and Matsaganis, 2013).7 
Using EUROMOD policy parameters for the three distinct years of interest, i.e. 2010, 2014 and 
2018, we simulate the components that critically affect labour market participation incentives 
at the extensive margin, i.e. the decision whether to participate or not. These components 
are taxes paid, benefits received, social insurance contributions paid, and labour earnings. 
The Participation Tax Rate (PTR), as in Immervoll et al. (2007), is a commonly used proxy for 
the counterincentives for employment which stem from labour taxation, as well as from social 
benefits. It is easily constructed on the basis of a simple micro-founded model (see Appendix 
8.1). PTR accounts for the share of gross remuneration which is paid for taxes and 
contributions or the share of disposable income which is lost due to foregone social benefits 
when an unemployed person transitions to employed status. Hence, it is based on the concept 
of opportunity cost. PTR reflects the net tax burden (taxes plus contributions minus 
allowances) of a household from a person transitioning between the states of employment 
and unemployment, expressed as a share of gross remuneration. Given that a welfare system 
offers income support at the unemployment state, this means that the net tax burden at the 
unemployment state becomes negative, as taxes paid at the unemployment state are less 
than benefits received, and as a result PTR is positive for most persons. The more generous 
the social benefit system at the unemployment state, and the higher the tax wedge at the 
employment state, the higher the PTR and the lower the economic payoff and hence the 
incentive for employment. PTR equals zero when counterincentives for employment are at a 
minimum and equals one when there are maximum counterincentives. 
Specifically, we can express PTR for a person 𝑖 in household ℎ in terms of the household’s 
disposable income: 













where 𝐸𝑖 represents the gross income of person 𝑖 when she works, 𝑌ℎ
𝑤 is the household’s 
disposable income when the person 𝑖 works, while 𝑌ℎ
𝑛𝑤 is the household’s disposable income 
when the person 𝑖 is unemployed.  
The above metric requires that counterfactuals will be simulated for each individual in the 
sample. For the PTR calculations, the taxes, benefits and social insurance contributions of 
individuals need to be simulated under both employment and unemployment states. 
EUROMOD will allow us to calculate these quantities for households and individuals. We 
estimate the PTR for each person in the sample by shifting her status from employment to 
unemployment, while computing the household’s disposable income in both states through 
a simulation via EUROMOD. This incorporates the impact of the social welfare system when 
the person changes employment status and reflects the respective counterincentives for 
labour supply.  
Given that the disposable income is measured at the household’s level, when calculating the 
PTR for each person, this needs to reflect the person’s transition between the two states 
(employment and unemployment) while keeping the employment status of other household 
members unchanged. This is crucial since taxation and benefits likely depend on the status 
and income at the level of the household. We contain ourselves to presenting the findings on 
a sample of employed persons only, for whom we simulate their transition to 
unemployment), because the reverse exercise would require several additional assumptions 
concerning the imputed wage of unemployed persons in the labour market, the working 
hours, the specific sector/employer, given that contributions and taxes may depend on all 
these parameters. Data constraints impede us from studying the transition between 
unemployment and inactivity, since we can hardly disentangle between active and inactive 
jobless individuals in our sample. However, analysing the transition between unemployment 
and employment status allows us to infer some of the incentives applicable to the transition 
between inactive and active population and hence assess the impact on overall labour 
participation as discussed in section 5.2.  
In the context of PTR calculation, the simulation consists of three steps: 
• We estimate the household’s disposable income without any change in the 
employment status of its members. 
• For each employed person in the household, sequentially, labour remuneration is 
equalized to zero and EUROMOD simulates all benefits for which the person would be 
eligible, including the unemployment benefit. In each simulated case of a person’s 
transition to unemployment, the system estimates the respective household’s 
disposable income. 
• In the example of a household with two earners, we first simulate the transition to 
unemployment for one of the two wage earners, while keeping the labour 
remuneration of the other household member constant. We estimate the household’s 




simulation for the second wage earner member of the household, while again keeping 
the employment status and labour remuneration of the first household member 
constant. We estimate again the household’s respective disposable income as well as 
the second person’s PTR. 
To compute the PTR for currently employed persons, assumptions were made in relation to 
the eligibility for unemployment benefits as well as on the duration of the benefit. For 
instance, to define the eligibility, we set the number of contribution months equal to the 
number of employment months before transiting to unemployment status. These months are 
then transformed into working days and are compared to the criterion of the last 14 months 
without accounting for the last two months. We further assume full take-up ratio by all 
eligible persons, in relation to social benefits. 
Besides, PTR can be expressed as the mathematical sum of its components, i.e. net changes 
in taxes, contributions and benefits when transiting to an unemployment status. The PTR 
equation can hence be written as a function of its components, in percent of gross 
remuneration: 
𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖 = − (
𝛥𝐵𝐻𝐻 − 𝛥𝑇𝐻𝐻 − 𝛥𝑆𝐻𝐻
𝐸𝑖
) = 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝐵 + 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑆 
where 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝐵 refers to the contribution of an increase in benefits, 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑇 refers to net tax 
reduction and 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑆  corresponds to net reduction of contributions when the person becomes 
unemployed. Equivalently, at the extensive margin, PTR measures the proportion of gross 
earnings lost because of higher taxes, higher social insurance contributions and lower benefits 
when an individual decides to participate in the labour market and becomes employed. 
Our analysis of PTR focuses on persons who are already employed. We consider active 
working age population between 18-65 years old. Students, pensioners, minors and disabled 
persons are excluded from the simulation analysis. Our sample hence consists of persons who 
are eligible for unemployment benefits in case they become unemployed. Besides illustrating 
the incentives for employment which arise from the system of social benefits and taxation, 
we are particularly interested in assessing the impact of a reduction in social security 
contribution rates. For this reason, we restrict our sample to wage earners,8 for whom we can 
accurately calculate the respective contributions on their income: (a) private sector 
employees insured with ΙΚΑ – EFKA; (b) banking sector employees insured with funds such as 
ETE; (c) civil servants and employees in former state owned entreprises such as OTE and DEI. 
On the aforementioned sample of employed persons, for whom descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 2, we simulate two scenarios with respect to their contribution rates, both 
on which we calculate the PTR to capture the impact of the 2014 reform: 
 
8 Self-employed, free lancers and farmers are excluded from the micro-simulation for two reasons, first since 
the policy reform focused on wage earners’ social security contributions and secondly because several additional 
assumptions would be needed to simulate the potential eligibility for unemployment benefits in each category 




• EU-SILC data 2014 and EUROMOD parameters 2014 including the 1% employees’ 
social security contribution for the wage earners’ family allowances account “DLOEM” 
(scenario before the 2014 reform) 
• EU-SILC data 2014 and EUROMOD parameters 2014 excluding the 1% employees’ 
social security contribution for the wage earners’ family allowances account “DLOEM” 
(scenario after the 2014 reform)  
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. The first relates to calculating PTR for a 
representative micro data set of Greek households, as well as presenting its demographics’ 
distribution in two distinct time periods: in 2010, which is the year when the first economic 
adjustment programme was launched and in 2018, which is the year when the third 
programme ended. The second part of the analysis relates to estimating the impact from the 
2014 reduction of social security contributions (reform) on the average PTR as well as on its 
demographics’ distribution, particularly across income deciles, gender and age group. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of sample demographics for PTR calculations 

















3,342 100% 5,662 100% 9,278 100% 
Gender             
Female 1,460 43.7% 2,474 43.7% 3,998 43.1% 
Male 1,882 56.3% 3,188 56.3% 5,280 56.9% 
Age             
18-30 700 20.9% 865 15.3% 1,342 14.5% 
31-50 2,020 60.4% 3,654 64.5% 5,750 62.0% 
51-65 622 18.6% 1,143 20.2% 2,186 23.6% 
Education 
level 




636 19.0% 681 12.0% 1,088 11.7% 
Secondary 1,193 35.7% 1,945 34.4% 3,288 35.4% 
Tertiary 1,513 45.3% 3,036 53.6% 4,902 52.8% 
Source: EU-SILC 2010, 2014, 2018, authors’ sample selection criteria. Note: our sample is the result of filtering 
criteria used such as to focus only on employed wage earners and is hence a sub-sample of the EU-SILC database. 
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5.2. Results 
The findings on the descriptive analysis overall suggest that counterincentives for official 
sector labour participation increased during the bailout programmes, as reflected through 
the estimated increase of PTR for the average household in Greece between 2010 and 2018. 
The deterioration of incentives for labour supply has been more pronounced among male 
and younger population, which is in line with the stylized fact that recorded labour 
participation decelerated for these demographic groups during 2010-2018 ( Figure 2). In 
relation to the simulation analysis on the impact from the 2014 reduction in employees’ 
social security contributions, there is evidence that incentives for official sector labour 
participation improved following the specific reform, especially for groups such as youth 
and women, both of whom exhibit relatively low participation rates. 
During 2010-2018, we observe an increase of the estimated average PTR across all income 
deciles, as well as the persisting stylized fact that counterincentives for labour participation 
are systematically larger for lower income earners, for women and for younger population 
segments (Figure 7). A comprehensive analysis of the causes behind the observed increase of 
PTR during the programmes lies beyond the scope of the current work. Nonetheless, one can 
note that the combination of increases in labour taxation due to the need for fiscal 
consolidation during the Greek sovereign debt crisis as well as the recessionary environment 
led to a significant drop of households’ take-home salary which in turn negatively affects their 
incentives for official sector labour participation, ceteris paribus. In this context, the negative 
effects amplified to the extent that the fiscal adjustment relied more on the revenues side 
rather than expenditures, or on raising tax rates (e.g. special solidarity contribution on labour 
earnings) rather than broadening the tax base. In all, Greek households’ disposable income 
decile thresholds exhibited a cumulative drop during 2010-2018, which exceeded 25%, which 
inevitably translates into an increase of PTR, ceteris paribus (Figure 8). 
20 
Figure 7. Estimated PTR by income decile, gender and age, before and after the bailout 
programmes 
Note: Authors’ estimations based on EU-SILC data and EUROMOD parameters for 2010 and 2018 
Figure 8. Households’ disposable income deciles change during 2010-2018 (in %) 
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In the objective to reduce labour costs without reducing the employees’ take-home salary, 
in line with the second adjustment programme, Greece reduced the social security 
contribution rates for employees by 1 percentage point as of July 2014 (“2014 reform”).9 
This percentage point was used to collect revenues earmarked for the wage earners’ 
family allowances account (DLOEM). Before the 2014 reform, we confirm the 
demographics’ evidence highlighted in the descriptive section, since counterincentives for 
labour participation appear to be higher for lower income earning households, for women 
and for younger population groups ( Figure 9). 
To assess the reform’s impact on labour market participation incentives and households’ 
disposable income we estimate PTR across households and illustrate households’ 
income distribution before the reform, using EU-SILC and EUROMOD 2014 micro data set 
described in the previous section, and then simulate the policy change, ceteris paribus, 
which allows us to re-estimate PTR and income distribution after the reform. In relation to 
the distributional impact of the reform, it had a positive impact on households’ disposable 
income, ranging from 0.4% to 1.2%, while it was more pronounced for low-income earners 
(Figure 10).  
Figure 9. Estimated PTR by income decile, gender and age, before the 2014 reform 
9 In parallel, employers’ social security contributions were reduced by 2.9 percentage points in July 2014. 
However, this policy change did not necessarily translate into a change of workers’ take-home salary, hence we 
do not include it in our simulation analysis. 
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Note: Authors’ estimations based on EU-SILC data and EUROMOD parameters for 2014 
Figure 10. Estimated 2014 reform impact on households’ disposable income, by decile (in 
%) 
Note: Authors’ estimations based on EU-SILC data and EUROMOD parameters for 2014 
The positive impact of the 2014 reform on labour participation incentives is reflected through 
a drop of the estimated average PTR by circa 0.5 percentage points (Table 3). The rationale 
for this reduction stems from the reduction in contribution rates which increases disposable 
income in the household’s employment state and hence makes official sector employment 
more attractive compared to the unemployment state. 
Table 3. PTR distribution before and after the 2014 reform 
PTR per income decile Low 20% Mean Upper 20% 
PTR (before the 2014 reform) 0.677 0.570 0.565 
PTR (after the 2014 reform) 0.668 0.565 0.561 
The simulation findings point out that the 2014 reform led to a systematic reduction of the 
counterincentives for labour across all income deciles. Furthermore, the reduction in PTR was 
0.59 0.56
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larger among women and young population segments (Figure 11). Therefore, the positive 
impact on labour market incentives of the 2014 policy reform was higher for population 
segments which exhibit lower labour participation in the first place. 
Figure 11. Estimated PTR reduction stemming from the 2014 reform 
Note: Authors’ estimations based on EU-SILC data and EUROMOD parameters for 2014 
Changes in PTR are directly related to changes in labour participation rates, as shown in 
Appendix 8.1. Estimating the elasticity between PTR and labour participation is an important 
avenue for further research. In the case of Greece, IOBE (2019) applied a similar methodology 
to estimate the impact from a pension reform on labour market participation incentives and 
estimated an elasticity of around 0.75. If we use this estimate in our analysis, the obtained 
reduction in PTR by 0.5 ppts would translate into an increase in labour market participation 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2014 reform: PTR reduction by income decile (in ppts)
-0.48 -0.47
Women Men











6. Macroeconomic approach 
6.1. Data and methodology 
In relation to the macroeconomic impact of labour market reforms implemented in Greece 
during the economic adjustment programmes, we explore their impact on variables such as 
employment growth, unemployment rate, participation rate, use of flexible forms of 
employment, average working hours, unit labour cost and inequality. To achieve this, we 
construct appropriate counterfactuals for each variable of interest, that will depict the 
evolution of each variable in absence of major labour market interventions. Specifically, we 
use a synthetic control approach similar to Stepanyan and Salas (2020), who analyse the 
impact of Spain’s structural labour market reforms, which took place in 2012. In Greece, the 
bulk of the reforms was also implemented in 2012, when changes in collective bargaining, 
minimum wage, employment protection and flexible forms of employment regulations were 
implemented (Laws 4024/2011, 4046/2012, 4093/2012). We hence consider that year as the 
turning point in our synthetic control method. 
In principle, the synthetic control method requires that the sample be split in two groups: the 
“treated” country or group of countries in which an implemented policy is to be evaluated 
and the “non treated” countries. For our analysis of “treated” units, we consider the three 
programme countries of the southern Euro Area where significant labour market reforms with 
common features took place around 2012, Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS). The method 
foresees the use of an appropriately weighted combination of not treated countries to 
construct a relevant counterfactual, to which the treated units can be compared to. This 
requires the use of a combination of other countries to construct a “synthetic” control country 
which replicates the Greek economic indicator’s trend before the economic crisis. Essentially, 
it is an extension of the difference-in-differences (DID) method, but it allows assigning weights 
in a more systematic way, by using statistical matching techniques for instance. Thus, it aims 
to overcome the often violated “parallel trends” assumption required by DID, due to the 
existence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. 
Building upon Stepanyan and Salas (2020), who use the synthetic control approach, 
introduced by Abadie et al. (2010), we employ the generalized synthetic control method 
proposed by Xu (2017). The latter provides a means of implicitly assigning weights using factor 
analysis techniques, which are often employed in quantitative finance. Specifically, the 
counterfactual for each treated unit is constructed using control group variation based on a 
linear interactive fixed effects model10 that incorporates unobservable common shocks 
(factors) and their heterogeneous impacts on cross sections. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the main advantages of the method we employ compared 
to the one in Stepanyan and Salas (2020) is that, firstly, it allows for multiple treated units 
(countries) and, secondly, the implicit weighting of the control units is easy to implement with 
 




the use of a built-in cross-validation procedure. This procedure does not a priori require 
selecting appropriate covariates for the matching procedure, and is hence more “data-
driven”. 
To construct our counterfactual scenario, a comparable control group is selected from 
advanced economies which are both members of the EU and the OECD and did not employ 
major labour market reforms after the global financial crisis, based on data availability. 
Countries that have implemented major labour market reforms (e.g. Czech Republic), also 
following the filtering criteria applied by Stepanyan and Salas (2020), have been excluded 
from the generalized synthetic control sample. We end up with a control group of 22 
countries11. For both the treated and control countries, we use annual data from Eurostat and 
the OECD on total employment growth, unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate, 
participation rate, part-time and full-time shares of employment, including involuntary part-
time work, average working hours, unit labour costs and Gini coefficient. 
We choose to use the interactive fixed effects model to capture the co-movements across 
countries instead of introducing exogenous covariates to explain variations in the variable of 
interest. Thus, the variability is explained solely by fixed effects and factor variables, which 
also encompass possible time effects. In this way, we avoid conducting specification searches 
and potentially introducing endogeneity bias by using inappropriate covariates. By exploiting 
the variations across our control units and given the choice of the control group, our results 
are purely data-driven.  
The selected approach entails an advantage in that we minimize the risk of mis-specification 
due to potentially inappropriate exogenous regressors, albeit it introduces some limitations 
too. For instance, the estimated reform impact may be influenced by other idiosyncratic 
shocks that occurred simultaneously with the labour market reforms, while the factor 
variables cannot capture unobserved confounders that are independent across units. In the 
case of Greece, this appears a rather restrictive assumption given that several other policy 
shocks took place during 2012, such as the Private Sector Involvement of sovereign debt, 
significant fiscal policy measures were implemented and a new bailout programme was 
agreed. To attribute the findings to labour market reforms, we run in parallel estimations for 
all three programme countries in which labour market reforms took place during 2012. Given 
that findings exhibit quite similar patterns, one can attribute them to the common policy 
reforms rather than to country specific shocks. Another limitation of the approach is that, 
although we allow for heterogeneous responses of countries to common shocks, it is possible 
that the treated countries are affected differently by common shocks in the post-treatment 
periods, implying a structural break in the model. Such issues may somewhat distort the 
imputed counterfactuals.  
 
11 These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 




A non-technical description of the employed methodology can be summarized in four steps. 
In the first step, we use countries in the control group to construct factor variables, that is, 
time-varying unobserved variables that explain the largest part of the variations among 
control countries. Then, in the second step, factor loadings (i.e. country-specific coefficients) 
are estimated for the treated countries using only the pre-treatment periods. In the third 
step, the number of factors is chosen optimally, so that the error of prediction is minimized 
in the pre-treatment periods. Finally, in the fourth step, we impute the counterfactuals for 
the treated countries using the previously determined factors and loadings. The above 
procedure essentially amounts to an implicit weighting of the control countries to obtain an 
appropriate counterfactual for each treated country. The Appendix 8.2 contains further 
technical explanations of the model setup, information about the control group country 




We apply the generalized synthetic control method for each macroeconomic variable of 
interest separately. The findings overall suggest that Greece’s 2012 labour market reforms 
had a sizable positive impact on reducing ULC, increasing the use of flexible forms of 
employment and slowing down unemployment rate dynamics. They also had a slight positive 
impact on the employment growth trend. At the same time, we find that the 2012 reforms 
did not improve labour force participation rates, while they increased average working hours 
and inequality. The 2014 reform lowering social security contributions is found to have had a 
positive impact on labour participation, confirming evidence from the microeconomic 
approach. 
The following pairs of figures present actual data and estimated counterfactuals for the 
treatment group of countries, i.e. for Greece, Portugal and Spain (GPS) on the left side figure 
and for Greece alone on the right-side figure. The number of periods used in each case 
depends on data availability. The counterfactual is estimated using observations from the 
control countries. The closer the estimated counterfactual is to the actual data in the pre-
treatment periods, the more reliable it is expected to be in the post-treatment periods. Given 
the observations on the control countries, the number of factors and their corresponding 
coefficients for each treated country are chosen to minimize the distance between the two 
curves in the pre-treatment periods. 
Labour market reforms appear to have had a small positive impact on actual total 
employment growth trends (solid line) compared to the counterfactual scenario (dotted line) 
among the GPS programme countries, including Greece (Figure 12). Indicatively, actual 
employment growth in Greece during 2013-2018 is estimated to have been on average 




compares to a positive impact of similar magnitude, around 1.2 ppts for the three GPS 
programme countries average during the same period. 
Furthermore, labour market reforms appear to have had a sizable positive impact on easing 
unemployment dynamics (solid line) compared to the counterfactual scenario (dotted line) 
among the GPS programme countries, and particularly for Greece (Figure 13). Indicatively, 
actual unemployment rate in Greece during 2013-2018 is estimated to have been on average 
around 4.0 ppt lower than in a scenario without the 2012 labour market reforms. This 
compares to a positive impact of somewhat smaller magnitude, around 3.3 ppts for the three 
GPS programme countries average during the same period. Especially in relation to youth 
unemployment, the estimated counterfactual scenario portrays an even gloomier path than 
the one recorded, which can be interpreted as evidence that labour market reforms had a 
non-negligible positive impact (Figure 14). It is noteworthy that the gap between the actual 
unemployment rate and the estimated counterfactual narrows during 2015-2018. The 
decreasing effect of reforms on unemployment across time should be interpreted with 
caution for at least two reasons: firstly, from a methodological perspective, the estimated 
counterfactual scenario’s significance gradually weakens in the medium term and secondly, 
actual unemployment rate decline may have decelerated during the 2015 financial crisis, as 
well as affected by changes in the workforce emigration trend or changes in labour 
participation. 
 
Figure 12. Estimated effect of labour market reforms on employment growth (in ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Total employment is defined in terms of number of persons 





Figure 13. Estimated effect of labour market reforms on unemployment rate (in ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the number of 
unemployed over the labour force. 
Figure 14: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on youth unemployment rate (in ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Youth unemployment rate is defined for persons below 25 
years old. 
 
Labour market reforms in 2012 do not seem to have improved actual participation in the 
labour markets. On the contrary, our model estimation highlights that 2012 policy 
interventions had a negative impact on actual labour participation trends (solid line) 
compared to the counterfactual scenario (dotted line) among the GPS programme countries, 
including Greece (Figure 15). This can be partly due to parallel fiscal consolidation measures 
imposed on labour taxation in the programme countries around 2012, which hampers the 
incentives for official sector labour supply, as illustrated in the microeconomic approach 
section. Indicatively, in the case of Greece, a special solidarity contribution was imposed on 




Figure 15: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on participation rate for ages 15-64 (in 
ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force 
over working age population 15-64 years old. 
 
In relation to flexible forms of employment, the 2012 labour market reforms appear to have 
had a sizable positive impact on the actual use of part-time employment (solid line) compared 
to the counterfactual scenario (dotted line) among the GPS programme countries, and 
particularly in Greece (Figure 16). Indicatively, actual part-time employment as a share of 
total employment in Greece during 2013-2018 is estimated to have been on average around 
1.3 ppt higher than in a scenario without the 2012 labour market reforms. Nonetheless, the 
transition towards part-time employment in Greece was often not the outcome of 
preferences, as the share of involuntary part-timers in part-time employment increased in 
Greece, contrary to the other two programme countries (Figure 17). Furthermore, the 
average working hours among full-time employed persons in Greece increased significantly 
following the reforms compared to the estimated counterfactual scenario, as opposed to the 
trend in other programme countries (Figure 18). Besides indicating increased flexibility in 
working relationships, and possible higher use of overtime work, the significantly higher 






Figure 16: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on the share of part-time employment 
in total employment (in ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Total employment is defined in terms of number of persons 
employed. 
Figure 17: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on involuntary part-time employment 
as a percent of part-time employment (in ppts) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Employment is defined in terms of number of persons 
employed. 
 
Figure 18: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on average hours worked for full-time 
employed persons 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Total employment is defined in number of persons employed 






In relation to price competitiveness, the 2012 labour market reforms had a significant positive 
impact on actual unit labour costs (solid line) compared to the estimated counterfactual 
scenario (dotted line) among the GPS programme countries, and particularly in the case of 
Greece (Figure 19). Indicatively, the actual ULC in Greece during 2013-2018 is estimated to 
have been on average around 10.6 ppts lower than in a scenario without the 2012 labour 
market reforms. This compares to a positive impact of considerably smaller magnitude for the 
three GPS programme countries average, of around 2.2 ppts during the same period. 
Figure 19: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on unit labour cost (Index 2010=100) 
 
Note: GPS stands for Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Unit Labour Cost metric used (OECD database) relates to 
the Business Economy and is defined in terms of employment hours. 
 
In the context of introducing more flexible labour market regulations in order to assist the 
labour market rather adjust through prices (wage cuts) than through volumes (layoffs), this 
seems to have had a negative impact on equality metrics, particularly during the first years 
after the reforms. The recorded GINI inequality coefficient (solid line) increased in Greece 
compared to the estimated counterfactual scenario (dotted line) during the first three years 
after the reforms, to be followed by a significant drop during 2015-2017 (Figure 20). It is 
noteworthy that peer programme countries did not exhibit such a severe inequality shock 
following their reform periods, while the results for Spain confirm the findings of Stepanyan 





Figure 20: Estimated effect of labour market reforms on the GINI coefficient 
 
Note: GP stands for Greece and Portugal, since data for Spain is lacking. 2004 is chosen as the starting period to 
achieve a better a fit in closer to 2012. GINI coefficient compares the cumulative proportions of the population 
against cumulative proportions of disposable income, post taxes and transfers. It ranges between 0 (perfect 
equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). 
 
Finally, as complementary to the microeconomic approach, we test the generalized synthetic 
control method in relation to the impact of the 2014 reduction of social security contributions 
by 1 ppt for employees and by 2.9 ppts for employers. For this particular application, we 
adjust our control sample by further filtering out all countries in our sample, which modified 
their social security contribution rates during the examined time span. This reduces our 
control group to nine countries.12 We find that the labour market intervention in 2014 had a 
positive impact on actual participation in the labour markets. The actual labour force 
participation trend (solid line) is estimated to exceed the counterfactual scenario (dotted line) 
for Greece during 2015-2018 by an average of 1.9 ppts per annum (Figure 21). This is in line 
with the evidence from our microeconomic approach in the previous section which estimated 
a positive impact on individual households’ labour participation incentives, which in turn 
could be translated into an increase of the aggregate participation rate by circa 0.4 ppts in the 
short-term.  
 









































































































































Figure 21: Estimated effect of the 2014 reduction of social security contributions on 
participation rate for ages 15-64 (in ppts) 
 
Note: Participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force over working age population 15-64 years old.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The Greek labour market had traditionally been facing significant challenges in relation to 
some of its features such as low productivity, low participation rate, high unemployment, high 
tax wedge, low use of flexible employment forms and high share of self-employed. 
In view of these stylized facts of Greece’s labour markets, at the onset of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the economic adjustment programmes pursued labour market reforms with at least 
two objectives. First, to support the adjustment in the economy, through reforms targeting 
to ease labour market rigidities. Their goal was to cushion the negative impact on 
employment when domestic demand was severely hit by the crisis, as well as to facilitate a 
faster recovery of employment as soon as the country would return to economic growth. 
Second, to enhance gains in cost competitiveness to correct the large imbalances in Greece's 
external accounts. In relation to their objectives, we find evidence that the implemented 
reforms largely fulfilled the second objective and partially the first objective, albeit left mostly 
unaddressed other long-standing weaknesses, such as low participation rate and high tax 
wedge. 
Based on a micro-founded analysis, it appears that counterincentives for official sector labour 
participation increased during the bailout programmes, as reflected through the estimated 
increase of the participation tax rate for the average household in Greece between 2010 and 
2018. The deterioration of incentives for labour supply has been more pronounced among 
male and younger population. Nonetheless, simulation analysis on a specific labour market 
measure which reduced employees’ social security contributions in 2014 suggests that 
incentives for official sector labour participation improved, especially for groups such as youth 
and women, both of whom exhibit relatively low participation rates. A possible explanation 




2014 policy intervention was limited and its positive effects on labour force participation were 
more than offset by other fiscal consolidation measures relying on labour income taxation. 
From a top-down macroeconomic perspective, through the generalized synthetic control 
method which allows to construct counterfactual paths for each labour market indicator, 
empirical findings suggest that Greece’s 2012 labour market reforms had a sizable positive 
impact on reducing ULC, increasing the use of flexible forms of employment and slowing down 
unemployment rate dynamics. They also seem to have had a slight positive impact on the 
employment growth trend. At the same time, it appears that the 2012 reforms did not 
improve labour force participation rates, while they increased average working hours and 
inequality. The 2014 reform lowering social security contributions is found to have had a 
positive impact on labour force participation, confirming evidence from the microeconomic 
approach. 
From a forward-looking perspective, there is evidence that further reducing the tax wedge 
can enhance labour market participation and narrow the respective gap between Greece and 
its peers. A continuous monitoring of Greek labour market trends is warranted for policy 
makers to implement informed based labour market measures in the direction of further 
increasing labour productivity, reducing unemployment and inequality, three additional areas 
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Appendix 1 - Microeconomic approach – Technical Annex 
The analysis of incentives for labour market participation at the extensive margin requires to 
focus on the persons’ decision whether to work or not. Each person chooses between two 
alternative situations, total disposable income with zero earnings from labour and total 
disposable income with positive earnings, should she decide to participate in the labour 
market.  
The theoretical foundation for the “participation tax” in labour can be presented through a 
simple model setup, such as the one by Immervoll et al. (2007). We assume that the utility 
function has a quasi-linear form:  
𝑈 = 𝑐 − 𝑣(𝑧), 𝑣(0) = 0 
where 𝑐 is consumption and 𝑧 represents labour earnings. 𝑣 is a positive, continuous, 
increasing, and convex function. 𝑈 captures utility from consumption and disutility of labour. 
If we use subscripts w and nw to denote consumption at the states of work and 
unemployment respectively, then the person will work as long as: 
𝑐𝑤 − 𝑐𝑛𝑤 > 𝑣(𝑧𝑤) 
The working person’s consumption is given by: 
𝑐𝑤 = 𝑧𝑤 − 𝑇(𝑧𝑤) + 𝑞 
Where 𝑇(𝑧𝑤) are transfer payments, taxes and contributions paid, while 𝑞 is the 
household’s income from other sources. The non-working person’s consumption is 𝑐𝑛𝑤 =
−𝑇(0) + 𝑞. The condition for labour market participation can hence be written as: 
𝑧𝑤 − [𝑇(𝑧𝑤) − 𝑇(0)] − 𝑉(𝑧𝑤)>0 
Which can be re-written as follows: 
 (1 − 𝑎)𝑧𝑤 − 𝑣(𝑧𝑤) > 0 
where 𝑎 = [𝛵(𝑧𝑤) − 𝛵(0)]/𝑧𝑤 is the labour Participation Tax Rate (PTR), which can be 
interpreted as an index of increasing tax liabilities and decreasing social transfer receipts 
when the person starts earning positive income from labour.  
In the context of a linear probability model, the empirical analogy for the labour market 
participation condition can be expressed in terms of a probability for participating in the 
labour market as follows: 




Where Pr(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)𝑖𝑡 gets a value of 1 if the person is employed under a payment scheme. 
Hence there is theoretical relationship between PTR and the participation rate which is 
reflected through the elasticity 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑡, i.e. the percentage change in the participation rate 





Appendix 2 - Macroeconomic approach – Technical Annex 
We assume the following functional form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖
′𝑓𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if country 𝑖 has been exposed to the treatment prior to time 𝑡 and 0 
otherwise. 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is the heterogeneous treatment effect on country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
𝜇𝑖: country specific intercept (i.e. fixed effect) 
𝑓𝑡 is a (𝑟 × 1) vector of unobserved common factors,  
𝜆𝑖 is a (𝑟 × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, 
𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved idiosyncratic shocks for unit 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and has zero mean. 
Assumptions: the errors are strictly exogenous, weakly serially dependent, satisfy certain 
regularity conditions (existence of certain moments), and are cross-sectionally independent 
and homoscedastic. For details see Xu (2017). 
Estimation procedure steps: 
1. Estimate an Interactive Fixed Effect model using only the control group data, obtaining 
the factor variables and factor loadings, for a given choice of the number of factor 
variables 𝑟. 
2. Estimate factor loadings for each treated unit by minimizing the mean squared error 
of the predicted treated outcome in pre-treatment periods. 
3. Repeat steps 1-2 for different values of 𝑟. Using a leave-one-out-cross-validation 
procedure, select the optimal number of factors 𝑟∗. 
4. For the treated units, calculate treated counterfactuals for the post-treatment periods 
using the factor variables from step 1 and factor loadings from step 2. 
If we denote by 𝑌𝑖𝑡 (1) and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 (0) the potential outcomes for individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡 when 𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
1 or 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, respectively, then we have 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) = 𝜆𝑖
′𝑓𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 and  𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) = 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖
′𝑓𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. 
Therefore, if we use the notation in Xu (2017), the average treatment effect on the treated 






, 𝑡 > 𝑇0 
where 𝑁𝑡𝑟 denotes the number of treated units, 𝑇0 denotes the point in time before the 
treatment occurs, and 𝒯 denotes the set of countries that belong in the treatment group, 
respectively.  
Confidence intervals: 
The set of figures below illustrate the estimated ATT for Greece, together with its 95% 
confidence intervals for each one of the macroeconomic variables explored. We note that 




nature of the data set variables in terms of time and cross-sectional variation, e.g. as Xu (2017) 
points out in cases where the number of units in the control group is smaller than 40. 
 
 
Figure 22. Estimated ATT on employment growth (in ppts) 
  
Figure 23. Estimated ATT on unemployment rate (in ppts) 
 
Figure 24: Estimated ATT on youth unemployment rate (in ppts) 
 





Figure 26: Estimated ATT on the share of part-time employment in total employment (in 
ppts) 
 
Figure 27: Estimated ATT on involuntary part-time employment as a percent of part-time 
employment (in ppts) 
 
Figure 28: Estimated ATT on average hours worked for full-time employed persons 
 





Figure 30: Estimated ATT on the GINI coefficient 
 
Figure 31: Estimated ATT after 2014 on participation rate for ages 15-64 (in ppts) 
 
 
Control group weights: 
Table 4 below presents the estimated weights for each unit of the control group for Greece. 
These can be inferred by combining the estimated factor variables (Estimation Step 1) – that 
are a weighted average of each country in the control group – with the assigned factor 
loadings for the case of Greece (Estimation Step 2). Notice that there can be negative values 















































































































































































































Austria -0.06 0.01 -0.18 -1.63 0.62 -0.13 0.58 0.71 -1.31 0.50 
Belgium 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.11 -0.03 0.20 0.56 0.98 -1.23 0.37 
Bulgaria 0.27 - - - -0.06 0.67 -1.85 1.77 8.70 - 
Germany -0.04 -0.13 -0.15 -0.68 0.30 -1.17 -0.08 0.83 0.53 -0.18 
Denmark -0.09 -0.09 -0.22 2.46 0.36 0.26 4.02 0.54 - -0.62 
Spain - - - - - - - - - 1.94 
Estonia - - - - - - - 0.00 - - 
Finland -0.16 0.18 0.16 1.06 0.23 0.51 0.99 1.50 -0.21 -0.37 
France -0.09 0.13 0.10 -0.14 0.04 -0.09 2.50 0.74 - -0.21 
UK -0.16 -0.23 -0.33 0.65 0.10 0.08 0.38 0.46 -2.77 -0.19 
Croatia 0.62 - - - -0.05 0.52 0.09 0.77 - - 
Hungary - - - - - - - 0.78 6.83 - 
Ireland -0.48 -0.65 -0.66 -0.23 0.46 1.16 0.80 -0.29 -0.86 0.45 
Italy 0.00 0.36 0.67 1.88 0.52 0.49 -0.11 0.79 2.57 0.08 
Lithuania - - - - - - - -1.03 1.83 - 
Luxemburg 0.01 0.08 0.04 -1.98 0.18 0.17 4.46 1.45 - -0.26 
Latvia -1.45 -0.53 -0.36 -2.01 -0.07 0.79 1.24 -2.65 -4.44 -0.62 
Netherlands 0.08 0.07 -0.19 -1.12 0.38 0.01 -0.27 0.80 - 0.38 
Poland - - - - - - - 0.66 -4.16 - 
Portugal - - - - - - - - - 0.11 
Romania -0.11 - - - -0.20 0.24 1.03 0.92 1.50  
Slovakia -0.01 0.48 0.78 1.75 0.26 -0.24 -1.32 0.54 -3.16 -0.70 
Slovenia 0.24 0.19 0.44 2.12 0.31 0.34 -0.21 0.96 1.37 -0.02 
Sweden -0.23 -0.13 -0.48 -0.73 0.02 -0.15 0.10 0.78 - -0.15 




We have proceeded with two types of sensitivity analysis.  
• In the first type, we rerun our estimations on each dependent variable, while removing 
each time the country in the control group which had the highest weight (in absolute 
value) in our initial estimation.  
• In the second type of new sensitivity analysis, we rerun our estimations on each 
dependent variable, while removing each time both Latvia and Ireland from the 
control group. The rationale of this second test relates to the fact that both Latvia and 
Ireland went through IMF/EU financial support programmes during 2008-2012 and 
2011-2013 respectively. Hence there is merit in testing the case whereby these two 
countries may not be appropriate to be included as control group countries. On the 
other hand, we decide to include them in the initial estimations for two reasons: (a) 




were of smaller scale and different timing compared to the ones in Portugal and Spain 
and (b) because we follow existing empirical work (Stepanyan and Salas, 2020) has 
scrutinized the choice of the control group for Spain’s labour market reforms in 2012 
through filtering criteria which led to the decision to include both Latvia and Ireland 
in their control group. 
Overall, the new estimations through both sensitivity tests led to counterfactual estimates 
which do not vary substantially from the ones shown in this paper, hence not reported here, 
confirming that the initial empirical findings are rather robust. The empirical estimations of 
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